REA vs Ghidra MCP
Two ways to put an AI agent behind a disassembler. One is a purpose-built agent with its own analysis loop and evidence contract; the other is a bridge that lets any MCP-capable agent drive Ghidra. Here is how they differ in practice.
REA
- Single CLI: install, point at a binary, ask questions
- Own planning loop — chains layout inspection, xref walks, evidence capture
- Ships a free pwntools-based ELF engine; Ghidra/Hopper/IDA unlock decompile
- Fail-closed evidence contract: every result carries evidence ID + provider versions
- Best for: developers who want the shortest path to a first verified result
Ghidra MCP
- Bridge server exposing Ghidra operations over MCP
- Bring your own agent (any MCP client, e.g. an AI coding assistant)
- You keep Ghidra's full UI, scripting, and headless modes
- Best for: analysts already inside the Ghidra ecosystem
same target, two terminals
Lay out a binary you own, with each approach (outputs from our lab, 2026-10-12):
rea — evidence contract verified: ran 2026-10-12
$ npx rea inspect-binary-layout lab-env/hello evidence_id: ev_6e479c83… / sha256 36cdabb6… provider: pwntools-elf @ pwntools 4.15.0;pyelftools 0.33;unicorn 2.1.2 [✓] normalized_result: 31 sections, entry_point 0x400320
ghidra-mcp — tool calls from your agent
$ client asks: list functions referencing ".conf" [mcp] ghidra.searchStrings(".conf") → 1 hit @ 0x1402 [✓] decompile(0x1402) returned to agent
verdict
faq
Can I use both?
Yes — they are not mutually exclusive. Many analysts keep Ghidra open for verification while letting REA drive exploration; REA itself uses Ghidra as one of its decompile engines.
Which handles large binaries better?
Ghidra's indexer scales better on very large binaries; agents shine at navigation and evidence capture, not raw indexing throughput. In our lab, REA's free engine handled a 4.5MB system library fine via JSON export.
Are either of these legal to use?
The tools are legal; the target determines legality. Use them on software you own, open-source binaries, official demos, or authorized targets — see our AUP.